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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: SOME THOUGHTS
FROM THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE
Richard L. Herrmann*
It results from the general principles of law applicable
even in the absence of legal provisions that an ad-
ministrative sanction cannot be lawfully pronounced
• . . unless the individual concerned has been given
an opportunity for an effective defense.
Aramu, Council of State [1945]
Notice and opportunity to be heard are fundamental
to due process of law.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 178 (1951) (Mr. Justice Douglas,
Concurring)
Introduction
Administrative law is a fact of American life. When and how it began
is a moot question; yet few would disagree with Mr. Justice Jackson that
"the rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant
legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values today are affected
by their decisions than by those of all the courts, review of administrative
decisions apart."t To Judge E. Barrett Prettyman, the field of the law
that we characterize as administrative law "is today the most important
of all the categories of the law." 2
As administrative law has grown so have the suggestions for change
and reform. During the last thirty years a recurrent proposal has been
that Congress create a federal administrative court. The first such bill was
introduced in 1933 by Senator George Norris. 3 In the same year the
American Bar Association also championed the creation of such a court.4
Bills advocating an administrative court were again introduced in the
*Mr. Herrmann is a member of the Editorial Board of Prospectus.
I am grateful to Mr. James L. Ackerman of the second year staff for his assistance.
Unless otherwise indicated in the footnotes all translations are the writer's.
'FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952).
2 E. B. PRETTYMAN, TRIAL BY AGENCY 13 (1959).
3S. 1835, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
4 A.B.A. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1933).
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Seventy-Fourth, 5 Seventy-Fifth,6 and Seventy-Sixth Congress. 7 The most
recent proposal came in 1949.8 None were ever passed.
Central to any question of change, be it in administrative, civil, or crim-
inal law is a concern for the preservation of the rights of procedural due
process. As Judge Prettyman has put it: "the thrust of every program for
administrative reform is towards a full and fair hearing." 9 The fear that
the creation of a special tribunal to review all administrative actions would
deny these procedural rights found its most eloquent champion in A. V.
Dicey.10
These fears continue to the present. After the American Bar Associa-
tion Proposals to establish an administrative court and the introduction of
the Logan-Celler bill in 1934,11 Robert Cooper undertook to rebut the
arguments in favor of such a court. 12 He argued that:
determinations of these controversies [tax disputes in the district
courts and proceedings by extraordinary process in District of Colum-
bia courts] is not suited to the judges of a specialized legislative
tribunal. Such specialization and experience as they would acquire in
time would be too one sided; it would undoubtedly tend to make them
oblivious to the considerations which affect important questions in the
private law field.13
In 1949 a critic of the McCarran bill 14 felt that an administrative court:
would neglect general principles and social policies applicable in all
litigation. . . . Ultimately . . . no judicial tribunal would remain
having a broad perspective of the law relating to all of our business
5S. 3787, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1931); H.R. 1297, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
6S. 3676, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
7S. 916, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); H.R. 4235, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
This bill was proposed by Senator Logan and Congressman Celler. It provided
for an Article III court with eleven judges. It would have a general power of
review of questions of law from most federal agencies including, inter alia,
the F.T.C., F.C.C., N.L.R.B., S.E.C., C.A.B. Review would be to the Supreme
Court by certiorari.
8 S. 684, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); H.R. 4661, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
9 PRETTYMAN, supra note 2, at 57.
10A. V. DicY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (9th ed. 1952). A typical passage is
found at 203: "There can be with us nothing really corresponding to the 'ad-
ministrative law' (droit administratif) or the 'administrative tribunals' (tribunaux
administratifs) of France. The notion which lies at the bottom of the admin-
istrative law known to foreign countries is, that affairs or disputes in which the
government or its servants are concerned are beyond the sphere of the civil
courts and must be dealt with by special and more or less official bodies. This
idea is utterly unknown to the law of England, and indeed is fundamentally
inconsistent with our traditions and customs."
11S. 3787, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); H.R. 12297, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
12 R. Cooper, The Proposed Administrative Court (Parts 1 & 2), 35 MICH. L. REV.
193 (1936).
13Id. at 591.
14S. 684, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); H.R. 4661, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
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and social and governmental activities and enabled thereby to develop
and apply judicial principles consistently in respect to all cases and
controversies of whatever variety.15
Such criticisms no doubt have validity; but perhaps Americans have not
looked far enough for the solution - at least as concerns the protection of
procedural rights.
For more than one hundred and fifty years the French have restricted
judicial review of administrative actions to the Conseil d'Etat.16 The pres-
ent day Council of State, the supreme administrative organ in modern
France was born Christmas day, 1799.17 Its origins, however, lie deep in
history for many trace its genesis to the King's council of royal advisors
of the ancien regime. Today it is probably the most important contribu-
tion of France to the art of government. "Its most significant achieve-
ment," in the eyes of one distinguished observer, "has been the creation
of a system of administrative law which is outstanding as a protection of
the individual citizen against the illegality, the indifference, the ineptitude,
and even in some instances the insolence of office."] s
Review by the Council does ensure a full measure of justice to the citi-
zen. The fears spawned by Dicey's writings lose much of their force when
we observe the Council of 1968. The French study our concepts of due
process of law;19 we would do well to study theirs. "Notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard," Mr. Justice Douglas has said, "are fundamental to
due process of law." 2 0 During the last fifty years and especially since the
liberation the Council has assumed the role of guardian of the individual
against improper administrative actions. In exercising its control over ad-
ministrative procedure and its power to annul improper actions, the Coun-
cil has demanded that the administration not violate a person's droits de
defense -best translated by the Anglo-American concept of notice and a
fair hearing. The evolution of this concept furnishes an objective correla-
tive with which we can evaluate the arguments that administrative courts
cannot adequately protect an individual's procedural rights.
In the early stages of its jurisprudence the Council merely required that
the administration conform to the written law. The concept of droits de
defense, however, goes far beyond this. Relying often on the general prin-
ciples of law, the Council has required that the administration conform to
principles not expressed by any written law. This is all the more striking
15 A. J. Schweppe, The Administrative Court Bill: An Analysis, 35 A.B.A.J. 533, 612
(1949).
16 Hereinafter Council of State.
17 B. SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD, 23
(1954) [Hereinafter cited SCHWARTZ].
18 H. Yntema, Book Review, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 409 (1953).
19 G. Tixier, La Clause de "Due Process of Law" et La Jurisprudence Rgcente De
La Cour Supreme des Etats-Unis, REVUE Du DROIT PUBLIC (1961) at 795.
20Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 178 (1951)
(Concurring Opinion).
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in a country where the written law is supreme and courts are without the
power to declare a law unconstitutional. In any proceeding before the
Council, if a party asserts that a law is unconstitutional, he will be met by
the statement: "in the present state of French public law a defense drawn
from the unconstitutionality of the law is not susceptible of discussion
before the Council of State."2 1
In theory the Constitution may have a legal authority superior to any
parliamentary enactment, but since there is no means to ensure control
of constitutionality it is "a principle without any sanction. Such a sanc-
tion cannot in reality be held to be a legal principle." 22 As much as the
French development may seem like the American constitutional concept of
due process of law, we must remember that the Council has never ques-
tioned the constitutionality of any governmental action. Nonetheless, the
French experience:
goes far towards demonstrating that the relationship between public
law and natural law does not depend upon the existence of an en-
forceable constitution in which specific natural law principles like
that of "due process of law" are declared to be part of the supreme
law of the land.23
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said, "the history of liberty has largely been
the history of the observance of procedural safeguards." 24 This is largely
the history of the Council of State.
I. No Annulment When There Is Substantial
Compliance With the Law
Before we turn to the development of annulment without formal ille-
gality, we must first mention those areas where the administration has not
complied with the written law but the Council has nonetheless refused to
annul the act. One of the four grounds of annulment of administrative
acts is that called vice de forme (failure to comply with a procedure
required by law).25 The Council is pragmatic and adopts a flexible ap-
proach. If the failure to comply can be shown not to have had any ad-
verse effect, the action will stand. Thus, where the law required a hearing
to be conducted over a period of three days and it was terminated at the
end of the second day, the Council refused to annul the action taken
pursuant to the hearing when it could not be shown anyone was denied
21 Arighi, [1936] Recueil Priodique et Critique [D.P.] III. 5.
-22 M. Letourneur and R. Drago, The Rule of Law as Understood in France, 7 AM.
J. COMP. L. 147, 150 (1953).
23 B. Schwartz, Administrative Procedure and Natural Law, 28 N.D. LAW. 169,
174 (1953).
24 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
23 SCHWARTZ, supra note 17 at 203. The other three are (1) Lack of Jurisdictions,
(2) Abuse of Power, and (3) Error of Law. See also M. WALINE, TRAITE DE
DROIT ADMINISTRATIF pp. 389-396 (7th ed. 1957).
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a chance to be heard. 26 Likewise, the American courts have not required
needless formalism. Normally before one can be held to have notice of a
federal regulation it must be published in the Federal Register, but when
a person has actual knowledge of the regulation he is subject notwith-
standing the failure to publish.27
If the Council held the administration to every formality, the adminis-
tration would soon come to a halt or at best continue at a snail's pace.
There are more than thirty formalities to be gone through merely to re-
pair a bridge on a national highway.2 8 The Council looks to substance,
not form, when it decides whether the interests of good administration
are more important than meaningless procedural formalities.
I. Annulment Despite Compliance With the Law
A. The Background: The Civil Service Law of 1905
If formal compliance may be dispensed with in some instances, what of
the situation where the law is silent as to procedure? We are concerned
with the obverse of the problem in section one: the annulment of an act
that cannot be said to be tainted with any formal illegality. The law has
said nothing about the proper procedure. In 1920, Alibert, a leading
French scholar on administrative law, called the procedural defect in ad-
ministrative actions the defect that arises from a failure to follow the
procedure prescribed by statute or regulation.2) In 1940, Berlia, another
authority, stated that annulment of an administrative act for failure to
comply with the written law "should insure the respect of that outer le-
gality which is the legality of procedure and which results from the forms
and procedure imposed by legal provisions touching the performance of
administrative acts."3 o
American administrative law, on the other hand, starts with an entirely
different point of view:
The dominant factor in the development of the procedural aspects of
American administrative law has been the provisions of federal and
state constitutions that no person may be deprived of his life, liberty,
or property without "due process of law." While the consideration of
whether an administrative body must give notice and an opportunity to
be heard to the interested individuals frequently involves difficulties of
statutory interpretation, the ultimate legal problem is whether the
procedure utilized satisfies the guarantee of due process of law.31
26 M. WALINE, TRAITi DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 398 (7th ed. 1957).
27 United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962).
28See WALINE, supra note 26, at 398 for other examples.
29R. ALIBERT, LE CONTR6 LE JURISDICTIONNEL DE L'ADMINISTRATION, 221 (1926).
30 G. Berlia, Vice de Forme et le Contr~le de la Ligaliti des Actes Administratijs,
REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 370, 371 (1940) [Hereinafter cited Berlia].
31 W. GELLHORN AND C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 709 (4th ed. 1960).
April 1968]
Prospectus
As we shall see, the French experience has come more and more to
resemble the American notion of "due process of law" and has moved
away from simple inquiry into whether the formalities of the law have
been carried out.
The basis for the droits de dojense is undoubtedly a 1905 law dealing
with the civil service. 32 Article 65 of that law specified that before any
civil servant could be subject to a disciplinary measure or to any delay
in his normal advancement, he must be given a copy of his dossier and
a chance to appear before the disciplinary body to present his defense.
The history of this law before the Council furnishes an excellent ex-
ample of how the Council-much in a common law manner-evolves
a body of law from the statutory skeleton. Berlia posited a hierarchy of
methods of interpretation used by the Council. The least startling in his
view was the method by which the Council interpreted the statute. The
Council required the dossier to be complete and no decision to be taken
on facts not communicated to the individual. 3 3 To make an Algerian post-
master come to Paris to see his file was considered an unreasonable bur-
den that violated the intent of the act. 34 Giving the dossier to a man suf-
fering from a temporary breakdown was equally improper. 35
The Council also began to apply the 1905 law to those linked to the
administration by contract but not part of the regular civil service. Any
disciplinary measure must be preceded by communication of the dossier.3 6
The second level of Berlia's hierarchy was reasoning by analogy. In
Scornet,37 an honorary title was withdrawn from a judge (a person sub-
ject to the law) for reasons seemingly motivated by a desire for punish-
ment. In proposing to the Council that it annul the decision, the Govern-
ment Commissioner stated that the growth of the law indicated the Council
was opposed to arbitrary decisions.
We believe [he stated] that the law of 1905 whose applicability has
already been greatly extended could be the legal foundation for this
guarantee (the right to see the dossier) .... You would be correct in
deciding that an action whose reasons give it a penal quality cannot be
carried out without first allowing the interested party to present his
defense. 3 8
These applications of civil service law did not strike Berlia as excessive.
He said of the law as it stood in 1940: "one has seen simply the applica-
tion of the text to situations that the legislature did not foresee."3 9
32 Law of April 22, 1905, Recueil G~nral des Lois et des Arr~ts [S. Jur.] 1015.
33 Botton, [1935] Dalloz Hebdomadaire [D.H.I 451.
34 Metras, [1937] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 536.
35 Hurlaux, [1937] D.H. 168.
36 Mandarin, [1936] D.H. 666.
37 Scornet, [1931] S. Jur. Il. 48.
38 See [1932] S. Jur. III. 57 for conclusions of the Government Commissioner.
39 Berlia, supra note 30, at 397.
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None of these cases talk of general principles of law applicable even in
the absence of a text. These cases rest on the Council's interpretation of
what was the probable intention of the legislature. But these cases contain
the essence of what later will become a general principle of law.
B. The Establishment Of The Principle Of Required Notice
And Hearing
In May, 1944, just before the Allies debarked on the Normandy beaches,
the Council handed down what many consider the landmark case in the
area of procedural due process. 4 0
The widow Trompier-Gravier had been licensed by the Prefect of the
Seine to operate a newspaper kiosk on the Boulevard St. Denis in Paris.
The Prefect, discovering she had extorted money from the woman em-
ployed to run the stand, summarily revoked the widow's permit. No notice
was given and no hearing held. Such summary procedure had always been
the law. The widow challenged the decision and the Council, accepting
the conclusions of the Government Commissioner, annuled the act. Its
decision is worth quoting at length:
Since it is established that the challenged decision was based on a
misdeed of the petitioner; since, in consideration of the significance
that revocation of the permit carries in the circumstances and of the
gravity of that penalty, such a measure could not be taken legally
without the widow Tr6mpier-Gravier having been given an opportu-
nity to be heard. . . .Petitioner can validly contend that the chal-
lenged decision was rendered without the proper procedure .... 41
The widow was not in any way part of the civil service, and there was
nothing in the relevant law that required either notice or a hearing. What
is more, it is almost certain she was guilty of extortion.
What precedent there was for such a seeming departure from traditional
law was inconclusive. The civil service cases (notably Scornet, supra),
indicated a "penal" action ought not to be taken in an arbitrary fashion;
the election case intimated that the Council required consideration of the
individual facts of each case. Outside the civil service the cases were few
and far between, and constituted exceptions to the general rule that, in the
absence of a statutory command, notice and hearing were immaterial.
A 1903 decision held that under a law that permitted the President of the
Republic to retire certain officers after thirty years of service without a hear-
ing and without giving reasons, the President "could not base his decision on
reasons that give the decision the character of a penalty when the litigant
has not been called to present his means of defense." 4 2
40 Trompier-Gravier, [1945] D.P. 110. Translation SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 398.
41 Conclusions of the Government Commissioner, [1945] D.P. 110.
42 Ledochowski, [1905] S. Jur. III. 154.
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In 1930 the Council had held that one could not have a state scholar-
ship revoked without notice and a hearing. 43 In 1936 the Council held
exclusion from a civil service examination without notice or hearing was
improper.4 4 Only in retrospect do these cases help establish a "precedent"
for Trompier-Gravier. All the above mentioned cases (including Trom-
pier-Gravier) merely held that the law required annulment. But Trompier-
Gravier crystallized the law. The Government Commissioner claimed to be
restating the law and nothing more. However, it is clear that the 1944
decision is one of the major supports for the postwar development of the
concept of procedural due process. What later became the generally ac-
cepted definition of the droits de d~fense as one of the general principles
of law was embodied in the conclusions of the Government Commissioner.
He stated:
When an administrative decision assumes a penal quality and has
sufficiently serious adverse effects on the situation of an individual,
your jurisprudence requires that the individual be given an opportu-
nity to present his point of view on the measure affecting him ...
The administration sought to punish a fault; it sought to accomplish
a penal end. It could not, in our opinion, disallow a provision that
governs all penal procedure. 4 5
In contrast to Trompier-Gravier, American licensing cases seem to show
a general disregard for the rights of the individual. American state courts
have become muddled over the problems of privilege versus right. If an
act can be constitutionally prohibited (i.e., the sale of liquor), then the
granting and revocation of the license may be at the whim of the authori-
ties. A typical case is Walker v. City of Clinton.46 Several citizens of
Clinton complained that Walker was selling liquor on Sundays and to
minors. Walker requested a hearing and a chance to rebut the evidence.
This was denied, and the town fathers revoked his license. The Supreme
Court of Iowa held that the sale of liquor was a privilege not a property
right, and not protected by the Due Process Clause. This argument has
been advanced in areas other than liquor licensing. 47 Such an approach
makes little sense. Once an occupation is licensed it becomes legal; there
is no rational basis for such a gross denial of fair play. In France, pre-
sumably it is illegal to sell newspapers without a permit, but the Council
will no longer tolerate ex parte summary decisions. Some American state
legislatures, following the Federal Administrative Procedure Act 48 have
adopted similar statutes. The Massachusetts statute reads "no agency shall
revoke or refuse to renew any license unless it has first afforded the
43 Ribeyrolles, [1930] D.H. 120.
44 Hoaran, [1936] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 743.
45 Trompier-Gravier, [1945] D.P. 110.
46 Walker v. City of Clinton, 244 Iowa 1099, 59 N.W. 2d 785 (1953).
47 See DAVIS, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.11 (1959) for other examples.4 8 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 60 Stat. 237 (1945), 5 U.S.C. 551 (1964).
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licensee an opportunity for a hearing . ... ,"49 The Massachusetts Supreme
Court has held that this applies even to the initial application for a
license.5 0
C. The Collaborationist Cases
In 1945 the most important "6puration" cases were decided by the
Council. These dealt with the expulsion from the civil service of all who
had collaborated with the enemy. In 1943 and 1944 the Free French
Government passed a series of laws designed to remove and punish those
civil servants who had collaborated. 5 1 These laws dealt only with the civil
service; by express legislative mandate, the law of 1905 was made inap-
plicable. The purge could be carried out "in spite of all prior legislative,
regulatory, statutory, or contractual dispositions."52 Any procedural re-
quirements must be found outside the traditional civil service law. The
"6puration" laws authorized the Minister of each branch of the civil ser-
vice, either himself, or through appointed commissions, to examine the
wartime activities of any person in his bureau. The statutes did not ex-
pressly authorize notice and a hearing. They merely said the commissions
must "hear" the accused. Aramu, a police officer in Algeria, had been re-
moved without having been informed of the pending action against him
or been given a chance to explain his actions. The Council annuled the
action holding that:
The communication of the dossier is not one of the required formalities
... but because of the regulations (that the commission must hear the
parties) and from the general principles of law applicable even in the
absence of any text, a penalty cannot be legally pronounced unless the
interested party has been able to present his defense. . . . [H]e must
first receive, if not the text, at the least the essentials of the complaint
against him.53 (Emphasis added)
This is the first time the concept of a general principle of law applicable
even in the absence of any text appears in French administrative juris-
prudence.
In stating his case the Government Commissioner stressed the unique
nature of the "6puration" laws in their political context but believed that
they raised no new legal problems:
4 9 Mass. GEN. LAW ANN. 30A § 13A.
50 Milligan v. State Board of Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 491, 204 N.E. 2d 504 (1965).
51 Law of August 18, 1943, [1946] S. Jur. IV. 5; applicable to all territory except
Metropolitan France. Law of June 27, 1944, Law of October 25, 1944, Law
of December 11, 1944, [1945] S. Jur. IV. 1631, 1687. 1725, applicable to
Metropolitan France.
52 Par. I Art. 6 Law of August 18, 1943, S. Jur. IV. 5.
53 Aramu, [1946] S. Jur. 131.
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You are on a solid judicial ground ... of more than half a century of
constant jurisprudence. The notion of a penalty implies the necessity
of a quasi-judicial procedure and consequently an adversarial one; it
also corresponds to a very practical need of administrative morality;
the obligation of the administrative authority to hear the litigants and
to receive their explanations, thereby reducing both the risk of error
and the possibility of an arbitrary decision.5 4
The requirement of notice and a hearing can readily be inferred from the
law itself. It would make the hearing Kafkaesque to require the com-
missions to hear a man but not tell him until he was before the examiners
why he was there and then ask him if he had a defense. But even if the
law had said nothing about requiring a hearing it seems clear the Council
would have arrived at the same conclusions. If such notice and a hearing
is a general principle of law then only if the statute had expressly pro-
hibited such procedures would the Council have sustained Aramu's
expulsion.
The "6puration" laws were sui generis, and the Council handled each
case with the utmost care. In other cases decided the same day the Coun-
cil held that when the essence of the charge was made known when the
party was called before the magistrate, but was of such a nature as could be
immediately answered after a brief hearing, the law had been followed. 55
The right to know the names of one's accusers was not essential. The
Government Commissioner felt nothing would be served by automatically
requiring the right of confrontation. Such confrontation should be allowed
at the discretion of the investigator if he felt justice would be served.
Otherwise it would only exacerbate already hostile feelings. Being denied
a right of confrontation did not mean that one went before the commis-
sion uninformed. The right to know the "essential of the complaint" was
required. All relevant facts must be given in sufficient detail; no decision
could be taken on any fact not made known to the accused.
The Council's handling of the "6puration" cases did much to ease the
transition from occupied territory to the Fourth Republic. To a certain
degree the Council was according the alleged collaborationist the same
treatment it gave French civil servants dismissed under the Vichy laws of
July, 1940. These laws gave the Council the power to suspend most civil
servants without a hearing.5 6 The Council subjected these laws, as well as
the laws dealing with the Jews, to close scrutiny. There were many appeals
but few criticisms of the treatment accorded the collaborationists before the
Council. The Council was able to give each case a sober second thought,
and serve as guardian of the individual's rights.
54 Conclusions of the Government Commissioner, 1 CoNs. D'ET. ETUDES ET Doc.
48 (1947).
55Daupeyroux, [1945] S. Jur. 196. Conclusions of the Government Commissioner,
I CONS. D'ET. ETUDES ET Doc. 65 (1947).
56 Kahn, [1944] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 49.
[Vol. 1 : 1
Administrative Due Process
There has been nothing similar to the "6puration" laws in America,
but the cases dealing with discharge from government employment are
good analogies. As in the licensing cases, American courts have been beset
by the problems of privilege. As we saw earlier, the right to a hearing
does not, in France, turn on whether one has a right or a privilege to
government employment. The Supreme Court of the United States has
recognized that a government job may not be taken away for political or
religious reasons. 5 7 When one is dismissed for security reasons, only in
the face of explicit congressional intent will the court deny notice and a
hearing. Such was the decision in Greene v. McElroy5 S and United Cafe-
teria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy.59 The latter case has been
soundly condemned. Professor Davis states that confrontation and a right
to meet the evidence is essential in every case unless the court finds that
"disclosure of the identity [of the informant] would be detrimental to the
interests of national security."60
Applying the above test to the Cafeteria Workers case, it is clear that
the dismissed short order cook can hardly be considered essential to our
national security. A recent Supreme Court case indicates that the Court
may be limiting the exceptions to the right of confrontation and cross
examination. Nathan Willner had been excluded from the practice of law in
New York since 1938 for failure to be of good moral character. Twenty-
four years later the Supreme Court, distinguishing the Cafeteria Workers
case as involving "only the opportunity to work at one isolated and specific
military institution," stated:
We have emphasized in recent years that procedural due process often
requires confrontation and cross examination of those whose word
deprives one of his livelihood.61
In France, cases such as Willner would cause no problem. The profes-
sions are largely self-regulating, but still under the watchful eye of the
Council. No disciplinary action may be taken in camera. There must be
prior notice and a hearing; otherwise the action will be annulled. 62
In determining the proper procedure before an administrative body, the
Council has found analogies in criminal and civil judicial proceedings. Its
attitude towards secret evidence before an administrative court is reveal-
ing. The case of Secrdtaire de l'Etat d la Guerre Contre Coulon63 is much
57 E.g., Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
58 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
S9Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886 (1961).
60 K. C. Davis, Requirement of a Trial Type Hearing, 70 HARv. L. REv. 193, 243
(1962).
61 Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103 (1962).
62 H. Detton, La Protection Par Le Conseil d'Etat des Droits de l'Homme dans
l'Organisation Professionnelle, 6 CoNs. D'ET. ETUDES ET Doc. 53 (1952).
63 Secr&aire de l'Etat A la Guerre contre Coulon, [1955] D.S. Jur. 555.
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like our own case of Greene v. McElroy.64 Coulon was employed in a
government weapons factory as an engineer. His security clearance was
revoked, and he was denied access to the factory. When his case came
before the lower administrative court, the judge told the Secretary to give
Coulon his file. When the Secretary invoked executive privilege, claiming
the file contained secret matter, the judge then demanded to be shown
the file in chambers, but agreed not to make it known to Coulon. On ap-
peal, the Council ruled that the plea of executive privilege was valid. But
more important, it held that no decision could be based on evidence un-
known to the individual.
III. Post War Developments
A. Decisions Taken In Consideration Of The Person
The essence of the Trompier-Gravier decision is identical to the case
law developed around the 1905 Civil Service Law. The party must have
notice; he must have time to prepare a defense; no decision can be based
on evidence not made known to the accused. In applying the principle,
the Council has been strict but fair. A person cannot escape the conse-
quences of administrative action by disappearing and leaving no forward-
ing address. Just as our Supreme Court has required good faith efforts to
notify a litigant of a pending suit,6 5 the Council has held that the admin-
istration must take all reasonable steps to find the party.6 6 Since 1944 an
ever-growing number of areas have been held to be covered by this gen-
eral principle of law. Cases such as expulsion from a state school and
removal from a hospital for disciplinary reasons are within the principle.67
In 1965 the Council reaffirmed the importance of the droits de ddfense.
Ariticle 16 of the 1958 Constitution gives the president of the republic
extraordinary power in certain circumstances. Acting under authority con-
ferred upon him by this article, President De Gaulle authorized the minis-
ter of war to retire certain army officers. In the directive nothing was said
about a right to see the dossier. Captain D'Oriano was placed on special
leave. Although "the institutions of the Republic" may have been threat-
ened "in a grave and immediate manner" (the words are in the Constitu-
tion), the Council annulled the action. The directive to the minister said
the retirement could be carried out "despite any other legislative action."
Nonetheless, the Council held that:
there was no law excluding the observation of those formalities that
must precede any decision taken in consideration of the person and
which constitute one of the essential guarantees of the interested party.
64 Note 58 supra.
65 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
66 Le Grontec [1954] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 805.
67 Gilles, [1960] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 98; Guenon, [1959] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 895.
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Considering also that at the time of the decision there existed no ex-
ceptional circumstances that made such compliance by the administra-
tive officials impossible. 68
One inference that can be drawn from the failure to require that the
dismissed see his dossier is that the principle is so well established that
it is presumed to be a part of the law.
Writing in 1950, urging the passage of a bill creating an administrative
court, one attorney hoped that:
the court will become expert in the problems of due process and of
practice and procedure before administrative agencies and find ways
and means of reconciling the government's needs for efficiency with
the individual's rights to justice, in broad terms and not simply in
terms of one agency. 69
The Council of State, in decisions like D'Oriano, goes far to realizing
this goal.
The last mentioned decision, although taken in consideration of the
person, had, nonetheless, a penal character. The Trompier-Gravier de-
cision has been extended to decisions taken in consideration of the person
when there was no disciplinary intent. The law of 1905 dealt only with
disciplinary cases. In 1949 the Council closed this exception. M. N~gre,
director of the national publicity agency, Agence France Presse, who ad-
mittedly held his job at the discretion of the executive, was dismissed
following a policy dispute. The Council held that the 1905 law required
that M. N~gre be shown his dossier.7 O Just what good this would do is
debatable since it seems unlikely that the Council would question such
policy decisions.
However, Ndgre has created a jurisprudence of its own. Nkgre has been
applied to the entire spectrum of the civil service. In Garysas,7 ' a postal
employee was retired because he was physically incapable of completing
his appointed rounds. Being a decision "taken in consideration of the
person" the carrier was entitled to see his file and to have a sufficient time
to present his defense. The policy behind Garysas seems clear. Procedural
due process is no doubt an element of any notion of the rule of law. In
France the civil service is an essential part of the state. It has fallen to the
Council to be the champion of the procedural rights of the civil servant.
The Council, in the words of one authority, has "to a great degree elimi-
nated arbitrary, ex parte, politically motivated treatment." 72
6s D'Oriano, [1965] D.S.J. 9.
69 L. Caldwell, The Proposed Administrative Court: The Arguments For its Adoption,
36 A.B.A.J. 13, 16 (1950).
70 N~gre, [1949] D.P. 570.
71 Garysas, [1955] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 585. See REVUE Du DROI" PUBLIC 337 (1956)
at 357.
72 WALINE, supra note 26 at 100.
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In protecting the procedural rights of the individual, the Council is im-
posing an increasingly higher level of administrative morality on those
with the power to hire and fire. The Council might well be echoing Mr.
Justice Jackson's belief that due process of law is not for the sole benefit
of the accused: "It is the best insurance for the government itself against
those blunders which leave lasting stains on a system of justice, but which
are bound to occur in ex parte consideration." 7 3
B. The Requirement of Reasoned Decisions
The Council has evolved during the last fifty years an ever expanding
concept of the droits de ddfense. Closely related, but of a much more
recent origin, is the requirement that the administration give reasoned
decisions. Traditionally, reasons were given only when the law required
them. The absence of a reasoned decision did not mean one could not
appeal for exc~s de pouvoir, but it made the Council's task far more diffi-
cult, and put a heavy burden on the appealing party.
In 1950 the Council handed down its first decision requiring a reasoned
decision. 7 4 A landowner claimed his land was exempt from a land re-
organization scheme being carried out by the Prefect. The Prefect re-
jected the owner's claim and took the land. On appeal the Government
Commissioner argued that it was the legislative intent that the adminis-
trator give his reasons. The law was so structured that the hearing before
the Prefect greatly resembled a trial. If a trial-type hearing were con-
ducted, it would defeat its purpose if no reasons were given for the de-
cision. Without a statement of reasons, the control of an administrator
acting within the scope of his authority but for improper motives (d-
tournement de pouvoir) would be illusory.
The Council held that "the duty to give reasons is essential in order to
enable the reviewing court to be able to determine whether the directions
and prohibitions of the law have been followed."7 5 There have not been
a great number of cases dealing with the requirement of reasoned de-
cisions for many statutes provide for them; the Billard doctrine has not
become a "general principle of law."
Nonetheless, it is a' fair assumption that when cases similar to Billard
come before the Council, it will most probably require reasoned opinions.
The Council has available a perfect analogy in the civil service law of
1959.76 This law requires all disciplinary measures to be followed by rea-
soned decisions. As with the Civil Service Law of 1905 the Council can
interpret broadly this new law, and then extend it to areas outside the civil
service.
7 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (Dissenting
Opinion) (1953).
74 Billard, [1950] S. Jur. III. 41.
75 Conclusions of the Government Commissioner, [1945] D.P. 110.
76 Law of February 4, 1959, [1959] S. Jur. 30.
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In its first decision involving the 1959 law, the Council stood firmly
for the individual.77 Mme. Riffault, a part time economics instructor,
was dismissed pursuant to a law that allowed such action to be taken after
an investigation by a joint committee of faculty and administrators. The
Committee gave its reasons in a report which was then signed by the min-
ister of education, and Mme. Riffault was dismissed. The Government
Commissioner urged annulment. The original findings may have been a
reasoned decision, but when the minister ratified the findings he did not
give a reasoned decision. The goal of such reasoned decisions is the pro-
tection of both the individual and the administration:
If the reasons must be found in the findings of the disciplinary council,
the administration will, in the event of litigation, be forced to refer to
a contradictory and often poorly written report. To interpret reasons
given by a single administrator is easier than interpreting reasons
rendered by a collegiate body, and the administration will be penalized
in future proceedings. 78
This decision shows how the Council will "distinguish" "precedent" to
arrive at the solution it desires. In a 1946 "6puration" case, 79 Mme.
Coulon, also a schoolteacher, was removed. The law required reasoned
decisions, but in Mme. Coulon's case the minister merely signed the report
of the investigating body. The rule prior to 1946 had been that such a
decision was improper.8 0 Had Coulon overruled the earlier cases? The
"epuration" cases were admittedly sui generis; in Riflault the Government
Commissioner, citing the conclusions of the Government Commissioner in
1946,81 pointed out, and rightly so, that the collaborationist cases were
exceptions to the rule and should not be considered as precedent. By re-
quiring the minister to state the exact reasons for punishment, the Coun-
cil is doing more than protecting the individual; it is protecting the image
of the administration and the belief of the people that they are contending,
not with an inscrutable and capricious body, but with a reasoning and
rational one.
The American Administrative Procedure Act requires that "all de-
cisions . . . shall include a statement of (A) findings and conclusions and
the reasons or basis therefore ... ."82 This would seem to place the Amer-
ican law in about the same position as the French law. Although Morgan I
held that "If the one who determines the facts which underlie the order has
77 Riffault, 1965, Rec. Cons. d'Et. 315; Conclusions of the Government Commissioner,
Revue Administratif (1965) at 390.
78 Id.
79 Coulon, [1946] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 106.
SO Soci6t6 G6n6rale des Ciments de la Porte de France, [19341 Rec. Cons. d'Et. 1064.
81 Conclusions of the Government Commissioner, I CONS. D'ET. ETUDES ET Doc.
48 (1947).
82ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 557(C)(3)(A)
(1964).
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not considered evidence or argument, it is manifest that the hearing has
not been given,"8 3 in light of later Morgan cases this rule would seem of
doubtful value. French law clearly allows another to hear the evidence.
Since Morgan IV84 precluded an inquiry into the decision-maker's mind,
it is clear that unless a statute requires that he who decides must hear the
evidence, a "rubber stamp" decision will satisfy the requirements of due
process.
IV. When Notice And A Hearing Are Not Required
One commentator has stated that the general principle of law known
as the droits de defense has now reached the stage where "no penalty may
be imposed without the guarantee of a prior adversary proceeding."8 5
This is not quite accurate. There is one large area of the law where the
principle does not apply. A "police measure" that is not penal, despite
the gravity of the consequences, need not be preceded by any formal
hearing. A police measure is an administrative action - although it need
not be taken by the police department - for the protection of the public
interest, health, or safety, and not primarily to punish the individual. The
object of the act is implementation of a public policy. The state acts on
the individual only indirectly. Review is after the fact, either by the
legislature or by the judge.
What may seem adequate in theory is difficult to administer in practice.
Police measures do act directly on the individual and often have severe
economic consequences. The line between penal and police measures is
indeed fine. The Council has been able to distinguish between the revoca-
tion of a liquor license for selling liquor in violation of a law (a penal
sanction), and closing the bar because it had become a "place of de-
bauche" (a police measure -no hearing required).86 The case of Mme.
Crozic-Savoure is a perfect example. Her permit to operate a pharmacy
was summarily revoked. The Council said no hearing was required because
"the withdrawal of the permit did not have as its motive any personal fault,
and therefore, in the absence of any statute, no prior hearing was re-
quired." 87
If the operation of the pharmacy constituted an immediate threat to
public health, then such action would be justified. This distinction has been
made in French law. For example, a driver's license may be suspended
temporarily without a hearing, but it may not be permanently suspended
without a hearing before an official board. In Forestier8 8 the Council rec-
83 Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480-481 (1936).
84 United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
85 J. Vabr~s, La Protection des Droits de I'Homme Par Les Jurisdictions Admin-
istratives en France, 3 CONS. D'ET. ETUDES ET Doc. 30 (1949).
86 Dame Hubert, [1946] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 300.
87 Crozic-Savoure, [1953] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 86.
Ss Forestier, [1957] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 60; M. Waline, Note, REVUE Du DROIT PUBLIC
(1957) at 662.
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ognized the right of temporary suspension in order to keep dangerous
drivers off the roads. Since the official board must be convened within
thirty days, a suspension for any longer period would resemble a penal
sanction. (Note that the suspension by the board is the "final" suspension,
but it need only be for a limited time.) In Forestier, the Council stressed
the preventive effect of the temporary suspension stating, inter alia, "no
general principle of law requires the litigant to present his defense." This
implies that had the suspension been for more than thirty days, and hence
a penal sanction, the general principles of law would require a prior hear-
ing. American law recognizes the right of preventive police actions with-
out a prior hearing.89
Forestier seems a rational way to handle the problem; but cases such as
Crozic-Savoure have been much criticized.90 A 1960 decision indicates
that the Council is limiting still further the area of police measures not
subject to the rights of notice and a prior hearing.9 1 A law enacted in
1900 and still in force in Alsace-Lorraine allowed the Prefect to pro-
hibit those who did not present "sufficient guaranties" of character from
practicing certain professions. Rohrmer was a business agent and held
himself out as an architect-both professions subject to the law.
In 1922 the Council had held that an action taken under this law did
not require a hearing.9 2 When Rohrmer's case came before the Council,
the Government Commissioner first stated that in view of the evolution
of the concepts of the droits de d Jense, the 1922 case was no longer good
law. There are three areas he argued: the clearly police area such as re-
moving such as a dangerous drug from the market, the clearly penal area
such as license revocation for infraction of the law, the third area being in
between. Whether a given act is police or penal depends on the motives of
the administration. 93 In Rohrmer the Prefect based his decision on three
grounds: (1) Rohrmer's prior criminal record, (2) unlawful business
practices such as charging for services not rendered, and (3) holding him-
self out as an architect when in fact he had not been fully licensed. To
the Government Commissioner, only the first ground justified the appella-
tion "police measure." The other two did not have as their primary goal
the protection of the community, but rather the desire to punish Rohrmer.
Had such disciplinary action been taken by a professional association,
Rohrmer would have been entitled to notice and a hearing.
Accepting the Commissioner's argument, the Council annuled the ac-
tion. "Having regard to the gravity of the measure, the sanction could not
89 North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
90 Morange, Les Principes des Droits de la Defense Devant I'Administration Active,
[19561 D.P.I. 121.
9' Rohrmer, [1960] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 12.
92 Birr, [1924] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 1033.93 Conclusions of the Government Commissioner, REVUE Du DROIT PUBLIC (1960)
at 335.
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be invoked until Rohrmer had a chance to present his case." 94 Rohrmer
again illustrates the Council's evolutionary approach to the development
of the law. The Prefect had argued that any decision taken under the
1900 law was a police measure when its purpose was to remove a threat
to the public welfare. The lower administrative court, on the other hand,
held all such actions were in reality penal sanctions and must be pre-
ceded by notice and a hearing. The Government Commissioner proposed
an intermediate solution which seems to point to greater protection of the
individual. The Council is saying that given the gravity of all "police
measures", whenever there is a doubt as to motive, the Council will find
for the individual.
It is in this area of police measures that the procedural rights of the
citizens are least developed. Some commentators believe that, except for
emergencies, nothing justifies denying a person the rights of notice and
hearing.9 5
Even if review is available, it is time-consuming (although not expen-
sive) and often insufficient. As one writer has put it, errors of law are
easy to spot, but errors of fact are not. Errors of fact are often the result of
simple ignorance on the part of the administration. It is in the best in-
terests of good administration, public confidence, as well as the protection
of the rights of the citizens, that the Council broaden the definition of
penalty and reduce the number of actions that may be taken without hear-
ing the affected party. 96
V. The General Principles Of Law
Since 1946 the requirement that one must be given notice and a hear-
ing has been called a "general principle of law". The droits de ddfense
is but one of several such principles; in some ways it may be the most
important.97 The development and application of all these principles is
beyond the scope of this paper, 98 but something must be said of these
principles in the limited context of administrative procedure. The general
principles are drawn from the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789,
the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution, the Preamble of the 1958 Con-
stitution, and analogies to civil and criminal jurisprudence.
When the Council applies the general principles it attempts to reflect
the will of the people as expressed by the legislature. The general principles
never rise to the level of constitutional limits on the administration. They
94 Id.
95 Morange, supra note 90, at 125.
96 Id. at 121.
7 Others are (1) Non-Retroactivity of Administrative Acts and (2) Equality of
Citizens Before the Law. See M. Letourneur, Les Principes GMndraux de Droit,
5 CoNs. D'ET. ETUDES ET Doc. 19 (1951).
98 See B. Horvath, Rights of Man: Due Process of Law and Excs de Pouvoir, 4
AM. J. COMP. L. (1955).
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are at best an unwritten equivalent to legislative law, but preferred to the
extent that the Council will not readily assume that the legislature intends
to disregard them. Letourneur has called these principles a restatement of
the current social, political, and economic theory of the day.99
American law is no different. In 1896, separate but equal was Con-
stitutional. 1 00 Fifty-eight years later it was not.1 0 1 As Mr. Justice Douglas
has said, "in determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory
we have never been confined to historic notions of equality ... notions of
what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause do change." 10 2
What is more surprising than the creation of a natural law concept is
the Council's open reliance on the general principles of law. Trompier-
Gravier did not mention these principles. The Government Commissioner
felt he was merely restating the law. The need to express openly the gen-
eral principles of law is found in history. In the eyes of many,1 03 the
four years of Vichy rule brought into being the general principles of law.
Before France fell, there had been sixty-five years of democratic govern-
ment. The four years under Prtain "threatened the very basis of the tra-
ditional French government, and after the liberation the Council totally
transformed its methods and set about building the general principles
which had already impregnated its jurisprudence."'1 04
The birth of the general principles has not gone uncriticized. Professor
Rivero has accused the Council of becoming a supreme court ii la Ameri-
cain:
Is there not in general principles of law an element of serious un-
certainty, a temptation to judicial arbitrariness? Is there not more
security, more stability for the individual in the reign of statute law,
even poorly made, than in the action of the judge however benevo-
lent?105
This reads much like Mr. Justice Black's criticism of the recent "natural
law" approach of the Supreme Court in cases such as Griswold v.
Connecticut.1O6
Rivero directs his criticism to all the general principles. His criticism
is valid; the judge must "create" the principles he imposes on the admin-
istration. However, in the area of administrative procedure his objections
lose much of their validity. It may be improper to create judicial natural
99 Letourneur, supra note 97, at 29.
100 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
101 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
102 Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
103 See Letourneur, supra note 97 at 19.
104 Id.
105 J. Rivero, Le Juge Administratif: Un Juge qui Gouverne?, [1956] D.P. 1. 21.
106 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381, U.S. 479 (1965).
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law principles in the realm of economic regulation; it is another thing to
look to the substance of procedure. If there are certain principles of jus-
tice, then it must be for the courts to see that they are followed.
VI. Conclusion
For all those who must deal with the administrative side of the federal
government - to some a hybrid, headless fourth branch 0 7 - the protec-
tion given by the Council, if not a paradigm, is a model for Americans.
The critics of the McCarran bill feared that a court manned by person-
nel with faith in the administrative process would tend eventually to ac-
cept the doctrine that "what the administrator does is the law".108 This
need not be. In France the Council of State is staffed with men equally
imbued with a belief in administrative expertise; they are trained for a
lifetime career with the lower administrative courts or with the Council.
Their decisions do not reflect a belief that the law is as the administration
says it is.
An administrative court like that proposed by Senator McCarran or
Congressman Celler would soon develop an expertise that would cut
across the administrative spectrum. Licensing cases, for example, would
no longer be seen as a single case but rather as part of the larger problem
of licensing regulated industries.
At the moment there is little enthusiasm for such a court. The pro-
posals of the second Hoover Commission109 have urged the creation of
separate administrative courts in only three areas: taxes, trade regula-
tion, and labor.110 The Commission recognized that "a plain, simple, and
prompt judicial remedy should be made available for every legal wrong
resulting from agency action or inaction."1 1 1 Nonetheless, it felt that out-
side of these three areas review should be left to the established court sys-
tem. The Commission's general suggestion that the imposition of money
penalties and the issuance of cease and desist orders be transferred to the
court cannot be disputed. Yet the Hoover Commission proposals do not
work a substantial change. These new courts would no doubt be expert
in their field and no longer could one complain that the rulemaking and
adjudicative functions were in the same person. Yet judicial myopia might
still develop.
The Task Force report urged the creation of a trade regulation court be-
cause the present system leads often to "inconsistent and disparate interpre-
tations of common statutory language, inefficient administration of the law,
107 See PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT, S. Doc.
No. 8, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
108 Schweppe, supra note 15, at 612.
109 U.S. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERN-
MENT (1953-1955).
110 Id., REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE, Recommendation 51 at 87-88.
111 Id., Recommendation 43 at 75.
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and inadequate protection of private rights."- 12 The creation of an ex-
pert tribunal might lead to greater knowledge of the field of trade regulation
law but at the expense of knowledge in other areas.
Those who would benefit from the Commission proposals would be the
large corporations, the labor unions, and those individuals wealthy enough
to afford tax litigation. Those whose problems are of a more humble na-
ture-social security recipients, civil servants, etc.-would have no access
to these expert courts.
A court modeled after the McCarran-Cellar proposals would be open
to all. As the world grows more specialized the need for men with both
the expertise of the specialist and the breadth of vision of the generalist
becomes more and more important. Even were we to create a court at the
start identical to the Council, it would lack the judicial esprit de corps, the
tradition of independence, and the respect of the people. Yet a court with
full power of review over the administration would, it is hoped, soon come
to look at the administration "not only with the judicial eye of those trained
to suspect government but with the administrative eye of those charged
with maintaining it." 1 3
112 U.S. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERN-
MENT (1953-1955), TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES
250 (1955).
113T. E. UTLEY, OCCASION FOR OMBUDSMAN 36 (1961) in W. GELLHORN, WHEN
AMERICANS COMPLAIN 37 (1966).
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